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TUIfly Belgium MAX delivery flight returns to Boeing Field after electrical stabiliser trim failure

The aircraft landed safely at Boeing Field at 19:09. According to some sources, it suffered an electrical stabiliser trim failure. The replay of the flight on Flightradar24 shows that the crew had difficulties maintaining altitude and never reached FL150 requested by ATC, nor were they able to maintain FL130 instructed later to return to BFI. ( More...

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william baker 2
Flight is rescheuled for today as JAF981F however its still delayed and on the ground.
Peter Fuller 3
FlightAware now shows flight JAF981F completed, arrival in Brussels at 8:14am UTC October 16
mbrews 1
Yes - the 9 hour delivery flight was completed. Flightaware records shows a likely C1 customer flight had occurred on October 10 Boeing Field - Moses Lake - Boeing Field.
David Loh -1
Failure on Delivery Flight?!? Doesn't that qualify fora One-for-One exchange?
DGR Rathborne 3
What is wrong with the Max ? Even after a lengthy grounding , and a large back log of manufactured , ready for delivery aircraft sitting in storage , Boeing promised that they would re-inspect all of them and make good on them . I've previously read on this web site , that Inspectors were finding FOD in fuel tanks . I float this question : should the Max all go to the wreckers yard ? DGR
wiregold 2
That plane flew directly over my house last night. I thought "that's not a normal flight pattern" and figured is was a Paine Field test flight.
Thanks to Boeing engineers and management for your efforts ... we know you are trying ... and given enough time you'll eventually get all the bugs out.
David Loh 0
Hopefully before a max crashes into your house. 😀
a p 1
Here we go again…
Roy Hunte 1
Not going to lie, this is the first time I feel concerned about the MAX since its re-clearance.
Cleffer 2
Typically you'd think "This is the safest plane in the sky"....uhhhh...
David Loh -3
Iit can never be a safe plane. It has its CG in the wrong position and is using computers to constantly fight to keep the plane in the air. This design philosophy is ok for fighter planes. Not for passenger planes.
i5xswipe 1
The CG is not in the "wrong" location. You frankly do NOT know what you are talking about. The aircraft has a forward and stable CG. The "computers" do very little, unlike an Airbus!

The MANEUVERING characteristic augmentation system, MCAS, which was the main culprit in the previous accidents, is exactly what it says, it is a maneuvering augmenting system, it corrects a flight control loading issue while maneuvering in extreme (Non-Normal) attitudes, due to different aerodynamic characteristics caused by the larger engine nacelle and its forward and higher position. This causes an aerodynamic lift increase, at the engines, which acted like a canard. This caused a nearly imperceptible decrease in the aft stick loading. FAA aircraft certifications prohibited this decrease, so MCAS simply trimmed nose down to keep that control loading from decreasing. It was never a CG issue. The MAX engine location in fact moved the CG forward to a more stabilizing position.

It is a terrific aircraft to fly, very predictable, smooth, very efficient and much quieter.
bentwing60 0
If you want to be paranoid from the peanut gallery, look up 'jammed stabilizer stories' and it is a far more entertaining event than 'stab. trim runaway, early MCAS aided or not', or electric stab. trim failure. You folks really don't want to know about all the possible failure modes listed in the emer. section of a modern jets QRH.

The lack of proper training and responses on the part of the crews of LA610 and EA302 are still gaslighted, and MCAS or not, their inappropriate responses, with a little help from their MX departments, lead directly to a dunk in the water and a hole in the sand!

Tyranny requires that history be slain, it's working! A quote 'from me'.
David Oakley 2
Stick and Rudder
The 737 history has a number of instances of "learning after two or three fatal incidents". For example, the 737 "rudder hard-over" problem was merely a suspicion at first, because the resulting craters were so small because of the "straight-in" collisions with terra firms - US585 in Colorado in 1991 and USAir427 in Pennsylvania in 1994.

It wasn't until Eastwind 517 survived the next incident in 1996 that the evidence from an intact airframe could be studied and analysed - leading to a fix of the rudder actuator problem.

An airframe consists of millions of components flying in formation. With the focus on "the Max", I am surprised if this is the only "slight problem early in life of this airframe" to be reported.

I am sure that Boeing's build quality is on top form and a source of pride for the manufacturer. I mean, they would not be shipping out airframes with debris littered inside, would they?
Highflyer1950 2
Probably the most accurate, shortest, complete explanation of the two Max accidents yet. Even with the current fixes in place, a flock of birds or electrical/malfunction could still cause MCAS malfunction but the QRH remedy has always the same and the poor training/understanding of the systems that lead to the accidents has proved the point.
21voyageur 5
In your comment, you mention "fixes" and quite simply, "fixes" are put in place to resolve "problems". Yes, training could have contributed to the crashes but the fact of the matter is that the Max8 is an aircraft that should/would never have been built. If Boeing execs and the board did not have their heads up their ()*() looking for their wallets decades ago and being 100% focused on short-term profitability, they should have applied some cycles to corporate and product sustainability. And IMHO, that is why they would not have ended up being in react mode to other manufacturers in that size airframe market.

Anyway my 2 cents.
It’s not easy to train on undisclosed systems. Still, pre-training flight was 12 minutes; post-training, six minutes.
Highflyer1950 2
It’s just a re-engined ‘37. Sure, it has nose up tendencies when under full thrust in manual flight, but the FAA required a same “flight control feel” in order for Boeing to continue the type certificate rating. That’s what MCAS achieved. Although it should have been mentioned in the AFM, and redundancy should have been built in, my understanding is that Boeing decided that any MCAS malfunction would, should or could be solved by either the QRH, Non-Normal or Memory items. The quickest being a Memory Item trim issue remedied by two little switches on the centre pedestal and sufficient airmanship required to manually fly the aircraft and return for landing.
ray hughes 1
The political inlfuence from a major defense contractor - very big money - hard for the FAA to resist and indeed, they didn't. So yeah, great caution required here.
Highflyer1950 0
Boeing or TUIfly crew operating the flight.
David Loh -4
No no no. It wasn't a "electrical failure". This is MCAS VER 2 in action. What? It's not in the flight manual? Figures.
Gary Bain 2
.....and you base that allegation on what?


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